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IN THE SUPRE~lE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ILARHY C. GHEGUIIX, \ 
l'laia tiff-ll C8 JJlllld ca I, ) 
vs. \ Case No. 
l\IUTUAL OF O)lA IIA l'.\!Sl 'H- l 11544 
ANCE COl\IP.\.XY and l·~Ti'ED\ 
BENE FI 'l' LIFE IXSl TJL\XCE 
COMPANY . 
' 1Jcjcndo11is-Appcllrmts., 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
PRELL\IINARY STATE:\IENT 
The parties will be ref erred to as in the Court 
below or Defendants may be referred to as the Insur-
ance Company, Insurance Companies, the Company or 
Companies. All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF THE I\:IXD OF CASE 
This is an action for benefits claimed due for total 
disability under two insurance policies. 
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DISPOSITION IX THE LO\\'ER COURT 
The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff against 
Defendants and J u<lgment was rendered thereon in the 
amounts of $15,018.75 for past amounts due on both 
policies to the time of trial, plus six percent ( G%) per 
annum interest, plus $:34,:207.0:3 for future installments 
due on both policies, discounted to present value (R. 
39, 40). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the Trial Court's J udg-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Both disability policies were in full force and effect 
on the date of Plaintiff's accident, September 21, 1964. 
The policy with United Benefit Life Insurance 
Company (Ex. P .1) provides for a monthly benefit 
of $100.00 per month for the life of insured for a total 
and permanent disability. The term "total loss of ~ime" 
is defined by the policy as "that period of time during 
which the insured ~Y able to perform none of his occu-
pational duties, recei·ves 110 pay for performing work 
or service of any kind, and is regularly attended b,IJ a 
legally qtudified physician, other tlzan himself." The 
insuring clause of this policy insures the person named 
"against loss of life, limlJ, or sight result.ing directly and 
2 
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i11dCJ:c11dc11tly of all other causes from accidental hodil,1; 
injuries receit•cd 7.1.:hile this policy is in force, and against 
loss of time hcr;in11iny <chilc this policy is in force and 
resulting from ( 1) accidental bodily i11;urics received 
nd1ilc this policy is in force, or ( 2) sickness contracted 
while this policy is in force ... " 
The policy vdth ::Jlulual of Omaha (Ex. P.2) pro-
vides benefits of $200.00 per month for total disability 
for the period ending 011 the first policy renewal date 
following a 15-year period beginning on the policy date. 
A "total loss of time" defined by this policy "mea111.; that 
period of time duriny 1chich you arc u nablc to perform 
each and every dut,lj of yo11r occupation, receive no 
earninys for performiny other work or service and re-
ceive medical treatment; provided, however, after the 
first twelve months of such period of time, it also means 
that period of time which .IJOU are unable to engage 
in any other yainful work or service for which you are 
reasonably fitted by education, traininy or experience." 
The policy further defines "injuries" as meaning "acci-
dental bodil.IJ injuries received ·rchile this policy is in 
force and resultinr; in loss independently of siclmes.Y 
and other causes." 
After the accident of September 21, 1964 had been 
properly reported, the Companies thereafter made 
monthly payments and Plaintiff submitted reports as 
req uirecl, signed by his treating doctor (Ex. D .13) 
through .May of 19()5 (Ex. P.4, P.5). He received a 
letter from Mutual of Omaha dated J unc 18, 1965, 
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whereby the Company refused to pay any additional 
benefits. This letter stated in part as follows Ex. P.3) : 
" ... , it was once again reviewed by the Home 
Office and it has been determined that the loss 
due to injury sustained on September 22, 1964, 
would he payable to February 22, 1965. Since 
disability continues since that date, it would he 
considered a loss due to sickness caused by the 
'spondylolisthesis' and that both policies involved 
does indicate that with loss due to sickness, and 
without confinement, not required to remain in-
doors, that such income would be payable not 
exceeding three months for any one sickness. 
A review of the file indicated that the loss has 
been non-confining since 2-22-65 and the drafts 
for $300.00 would represent the final payment of 
benefits due because of non-confining total dis-
a bili t.IJ." 
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the lawsuits in question 
seeking to recover benefits for total, permanent disabil-
ity provided by said policies. 
Plaintiff is a 54 year old man with a fifth grade 
education. He has worked for approximately 30 years, 
all of his adult life, as a brick laye1 except for a six 
months period of time when he was a easer and stacker 
for Fisher Brewery in approximately 1943 (R. 52, 53). 
He has had no experience other than as a brick layer. 
Brick laying involves hard physical labor, involving 
bending, lifting and moving mortar in a wheelbarrow. 
Plaintiff has, on occasion, worked as a brick contractor, 
but as a brick contractor, he had to perform the same 
4 
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kinJ of hard physical labor as a brick layer ( R. 53, 5-t.). 
Prior to the accident in question, he had worked cou-
tinuously ancl had enjoyed good health. He had ne,·cr 
had any complaints of back pain, and had never seen 
a doctor for complaints in his back ( R. 54, 55). 
On September 21, 1964, while working for \\T estern 
States l\lasonry on a job at 24th South and 8th \Vest, 
Plaintiff was working along a wall on a scaffold, when, 
all of a sudden, the plank fell out from underneath him 
and he had to grab the wall and the scaffold and hang 
for a period of time to keep from falling approximately 
H feet. He was ultimately rescued (R. 5G) . .Approxi-
mately an hour and one-half later, his back started to 
ache and by 4 :00 P.M. it was "killing" him. This pain 
was in his low back and radiated down his left leg (ll. 
5(), 57). 
At the time of the accident, Plaintiff weighed 
approximately ~18 pounds. At the time of trial, he 
weighed approximately 220 pounds ( R. 58). 
Plaintiff went home from work and took a hot bath, 
but the pain did not leave. The next morning he saw 
Dr. Lamb and was started on physical therapy (R. 58). 
Dr. Lamb diagnosed Plaintiff's condition as a spondy-
lolisthesis and that he had recefred some injury causing 
pressure on the nerve roots at the lower lumbar level 
accounting for the numbness that he had, and the pain 
that he had in his back and in his legs ( R. 92). Plaintiff 
was given physical therapy in the hospital in October 
but he failed to respond ( R. 93, 94). 
5 
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On October :23, 1964, Dr. Lamb operated on Plain-
tiff's low back; the operation involving the remoYal of 
bone oYer the spinal eallal, the lamina at L-5, an ex-
ploration of the nene roots and disc space between 
L-5 and the sacrum, and a fusion between L-4 and the 
sacrum ( R. 94) . 
Dr. Lamb demonstrated and described to the Court 
a sponlylolisthesis as a lack of bony union between the 
articulation between L-5 and S-1 ( R.87, 88). The 
result is a condition of instability making the spine more 
susceptible to injury. 
l3ecause of continued pain in the back and finding 
that there was some motion between the 4th and 5th 
lumbar vertebrae, Plaintiff was operated on again on 
February 11, 1966, at which time there was a fusion 
between L-4 and L-5, and also the joint between L-3 
and L-4. His symptoms have persisted since the opera-
tion of February 11, 1966 and his case has been fol-
lowed at regular intervals since that time (R. 94, 95, 
96, 97). 
Dr. Lamb testified that Plaintiff is permanently 
disabled for most of the types of work for which he 
would be equipped and specifically that he is disabled 
from performing the work of a brick layer as described 
to him by Plaintiff. As far as his ability to do any 
physical labor, the doctor testified as follows ( R. 98) : 
"Q. 'Vhat is your opinion? 
A. I don't think that he is going to be able to 
do any appreciable lifting or any work that re-
6 
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quires acth·ity. any stooping or bending. As 
a matter of fact, the last time he was in the office, 
he was complaining considerably of' sitting for 
any length of time. 
(.J. Has he also complained of ~tanding for any 
periods of time? 
A. Yes." 
As to the cause of Plaintiffs disabilitv Dr. Lamb 
. , 
testified as follows ( R. 99) : 
"Q. Now, doctor, assuming the accident as de-
scribed and the fact that prior to the accident, 
Mr. Greguhn had no complaints in his back, and 
assuming the conditions you have found since 
and the treatments, aud so forth, do vou ha,·e 
an opinion as to whether or not the· accident 
that he described on September 21, J9(i4, prob-
ably caused the disability that you've indicated? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 'Vhat is your opinion? 
A. 'Veil, according to this man's history, he 
had worked up until that time, and I never felt 
that he should be released to go back to that 
type of work. I don't think that he will be able 
to return to that type of work. 
(~. 'Vhat is your opinion in regard to the cause 
of his disability? 
A. I thi11ll· that. his disability is related to that 
accident." 
Dr. Lamb further testified that there are people 
having a spondylolisthesis condition who are able to 
liYe a normal life ( R. 99) . 
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Concerning the fact that Plaintiff had some degene-
rative disc disease in his back prior to the accident, Dr. 
Lamb testified that degenerative disc disease is some-
thing that happens to all of us; that at the age of 18, 
the tissues quit building up and start to degenerate, so 
we all have a certain amount of this ( R. 109) . Further-
more, Dr. Lamb testified that assuming that Plaintiff 
had no complaints in his back prior to the accident as 
testified to by Plaintiff, that without the accident he 
could very well have gone on indefinitely without hav-
ing back complaints (R. 109). 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook was called as a witness by 
Defendants and on cross-examination testified in part 
as follows (R. 155): 
"Q. And I suppose, doctor, that you would 
agree that if Mr. Greguhn never had any com-
plaints before the accident of September 21, 
1964, that he suffered the accident as he de-
scribed it to you, and that the complaints dated 
from then, you would agree, would you not, that 
this accident was the thing that precipitated 
these symptoms that he later suffered? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that these were the things that necessi-
tated the operations? 
A. Yes." 
Dr. Holbrook also testified that even after the 
second operation, x-rays showed that there was some 
definite movement between L-3 and L-4 and suspected 
movement between L-4 and L-5 ( R. 152) Further, 
8 
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he stated that the 20% disability rating which he 
assessed was purely a disability consisting of loss of 
bodily function and that Plaintiff is totally disable<l 
from being a brick mason ( R. 153) . 
Dr. Wallace Hess, who was called as a witness 
for Defendants, also found that there was a mild amount 
of motion at the fourth level and that there was a 20% 
permanent partial impairment ( R. 169). On cross-
examination, Dr. Hess stated that his assessment of 
permanent disability is solely as to bodily function. Also, 
Dr. Hess indicated that degenerative disc changes are 
a common occurrence in persons growing older ( R. 
172). 
Plaintiff testified that at the present time, he is 
unable to bend over and lift objects and that there is 
110 kind of physical work which he is able to do (R. 61, 
62). He further testified that in the Summer of 1968, 
he made application to the Utah State Board of Edu-
cation, Division of Rehabilitation, for rehabilitation 
and that his application was denied (R. 63). 
Dr. Moroni H. Brown was called as a witness by 
Plaintiff. He is an Associate Professor of Psychology 
at the University of Utah, and for 12 years or so has 
been doing work at the Rehabilitation Center at the 
University of Utah. He has also been a vocational con-
sultant for the Bureau of Disability Appeals for ap-
proximately six or seven years concerning Social Secur-
ity Appeals. Dr. Brown testified that he had listened 
to the testimony of Dr. Lamb concerning the injuries 
9 
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and disability experienced by Plaintiff. He was asked 
the following hypothetical question ( R. 131) : 
"Q. Now, Dr. llrown, I will ask you to assume 
a few facts concerning .1\ir. Greguhn. Assume 
that .Mr. Greguhn is a man 54 years of age. 
Assume that you observed .Mr. Greguhn here 
in court, his general build and dimensions and 
weight, and so forih. Assume that for the past 
20 some odd years ~Ir. Greguhn has been blind 
in one eye, having a reasonably good visibility 
out of the other eye. Assume that his entire 
adult life, .:Mr. Greguhn has worked as a brick 
mason and a brick contractor in this area, except 
for a short period of time, approximately six 
months, when he was employed at Fisher Brew-
ery, and was engaged in stacking objects and 
other things. Assume that .Mr. Greguhn has a 
fifth grade education, and assume the disability 
that he now has as stated by Dr. Lamb in his 
testimony, I'll ask you whether or not you have 
an opinion, assuming all of these facts, as to 
whether or not Mr. Greguhn can be rehabilitated 
for any type of employment for profit in this 
community? 
* * * 
A. Yes, I have an opinion. 
Q. Now I'll ask you the question that counsel 
is about to object to. \Vill you tell us your 
opinion? 
* * * 
A. I'd be very pessimistic about the chances of 
his being rehabilitated. 
Q. \Vhy is that? 
A. I'm taking into consideration the fact that 
it has been brought out here that he went to the 
10 
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fifth grade. I don't know whether he finished 
the fifth grade or not, but that's his educational 
background. He has had no other type of train-
ing that has been brought out here except his 
work experience. His work experience has been 
mentioned here, and has been of a type, accord-
ing to the testimony of Dr. Lamb, that he can-
not continue. I do not see much in the way of 
transferable skills to other types of occupations, 
and with his educational background and his age, 
I would not think it would be very possible for 
him to go back to school or receive vocational 
training in some other area." 
It was agreed and the Court ruled that testimony 
concerning a lump sum to represent the present value 
of future benefits would be laken out of the hearing 
of the jury (R. 50). Pursuant thereto, Plaintiff pro-
duced testimony concerning the present value for the 
future benefits. 
It was stipulated by counsel that if Mr. Ralph 
Cowan, the Trust Officer of First Security Bank, were 
called to testify, he would testify that an ordinary 
person in this community exercising reasonable judg-
ment and prudence could invest money on the present 
market and receive the rate of 51,4% interest in a safe 
investment, preserving the principal. 
Mr. German Ellsworth Brunson, a Certified Public 
Accountant, a partner with the firm of Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell & Co., testified concerning the computations 
for the future benefits involved in the insurance poli-
cies. Exhibit P.15 gives the figures for both policies, 
11 
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both as to the payments in arrear, with interest of 6% 
per annum to the date of the trial, and as to the future 
payments provided in both policies. The payments in 
Policy No. 1 run through September 1, 1979, and in 
Policy No. 2 for the life expectancy of 19.70 years. The 
life expectancy was obtained from the United States 
Life Tables 1959-61, compiled and published by the 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
Public Health Service (R. 124) (Ex. P.15). This 
exhibit contained the figures which later resulted in 
the amount of the judgment rendered in favor of Plain-
tiff against Defendants, full credit having been given 
in the computations for the benefits which Defendants 
had paid under its claim that all Plaintiff was entitled 
to was sick benefits. (R. 123, 124, 125, 126). This 
exhibit was not given to the jury but was used by the 
Court after the verdict was rendered for the computa-
tion of the amount of the judgment. 
On cross examination as to whether or not the 
tables included persons with health problems, Mr. Brun-
son stated that the tables related to total population 
which included persons with and without health prob-
lems (R. 126, 127). 
The Court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 
13A: 
"You are instructed that in order for the Plain-
tiff to prevail in this action, he has the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence: 
( 1) That the incident of September 21, 1964 
activated and precipitated a latent condition 
12 
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to a disability condition, and ( 2) That said dis-
ability condition, if any, was a total and per-
manent disability as defined in these instructions. 
If you find that the Plaintiff has not proved 
both of the foregoing, then you must return a 
verdict in favor of the Defendants and against 
the Plaintiff of no cause of action." 
The Court defined total and permanent disability 
for the jury in Instruction No. 14 as follows: 
"Total and permanent disability in this case 
means that the Plaintiff has a condition which 
disallows him from following his occupation and 
from doing substantially all the acts that are 
necessarily and usually performed by one who 
follows that occupation." 
And further, the Court instructed the jury in Instruc-
tion No. 16: 
"You are instructed that the words in the Policy 
with Mutual of Omaha, 'unable to engage in any 
other gainful work or service for which you are 
reasonably fitted by education, training or ex-
perience', means other work than the usual oc-
cupation of the insured, for which he is reason-
ably fitted by education, training or experience, 
that he is physically able to perform, which work 
must be remunerative and not merely nominal." 
and further in Instruction No. 17: 
"You are instructed that the words contained 
in the Policy with United Benefit Life Insur-
ance Company, Omaha, 'that period of time dur-
ing which the insured is able to perform none of 
his occupational duties, received no pay for his 
13 
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work of any kind', contemplates the period of 
time during which the insured is physically un-
able to perform his regular occupation in the 
sense that in order to carry on his regular occu-
pation, he must be able to substantially perform 
all the acts that are necessarily and usually per-
formed by one who follows that occupation." 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff 
and against Defendants and judgment was rendered 
thereon (R. 38, 39, 40). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINED 
THE VERDICT. 
The Court correctly instructed the jury as to what 
they must find by a prenonderance of the evidence in 
order to find in favor of the Plaintiff. The evidence 
supported their finding, and, therefore, the verdict and 
judgment must be upheld. Where evidence conflicts, 
the verdict cannot be reversed on appeal on the ground 
that it is not supported by the evidence. Lee vs. New 
York Life Insurance Co., (1938) 95 Utah 445, 82 P.2d 
178. Only those jury verdicts which appear to be unsup-
ported by any credible evidence which would justify 
them in the minds of reasonable men, will be disturbed 
on appeal. Reynold.Y v. W. W. Clyde & Co. (1956) 5 
Utah 2d 151, 298 P.2d 530. 
There was ample evidence in this case that the non-
disabling, asymptomatic dormant condition of spondy-
14 
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lolisthesis was activated and precipitated to a disabling 
condition by the accident in question. The evidence 
brought the case squarely within the holding of Lee 
v. New Yor/1: Life Insurance Co., supra, where the 
Court stated: 
"The rule, as we believe it to be on the facts 
which the jury was justified in finding, is that 
where au accidental injury sets in motion or 
starts activity of a latent or dormant disease and 
such disease contributed to the death after having 
been so precipitated by lhc accident, the disease 
is not a direct or iudirect cause of death, nor a 
contributing cause within the meaning of the 
terms of the policy, but the accident which start-
ed the mischief and precipitated the condition 
resulting in death is the sole cause of death." 
In that case, deceased had a diseased gall bladder prior 
to the accident, but the accidental injury to his abdomen, 
according to the treating doctor, caused an infection 
to spread and infect the appendix making necessary the 
operation which caused the death. 
The uncontradicted testimony in the case at bar 
is that Plaintiff worked continuously for many years 
to the time of the accident with no complaint concern-
ing his back. He had sought no medical assistance for 
any problems. The case was submitted to the jury 
squarely within the ruling of the Lee case as to whether 
or not the incident of September 21, 1964, activated 
and precipitated a latent condition to a disability con-
dition, and whether the disability, if any, was a total 
and permanent disability as defined by the instructions. 
15 
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This case is also squarely within the holding of 
Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the 
United States (1937) 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060. The 
Court held the disability to be within the classification 
of an accident causing a diseased condition which to-
gether with the accident resulted in the disability. The 
Court, in a thorough discussion of the problems pre-
sented in this type of a case, discussed the meaning of 
the term "existing disease" as not meaning a temporary 
disorder or derangement of the bodily organs, system, 
or functions, nor a tendency or susceptibility to a dis-
ease, but a chronic or definite affliction such as would 
be embraced in the common understanding and mean-
ing of the term "diseased" or "sick". Also, the Court 
held that the term "independently of all other causes" 
does not mean uninfluenced or unaffected by any other 
cause, but means uncontrolled l:y any other cause, that 
is, that there was no independent intervening cause 
unproduced or uninfluenced by the injury, which, acting 
of itself and without stimulation by the injury tends 
to produce the result. 
The Court quotes from the opinion of Chief Justice 
Rugg of 'the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the case 
of Leland v. Order of United Comm,ercial Travelers of 
America, 233 Mass. 558, 124 N .E. 517, as follows: 
"If there is no active disease, but merely a 
frail general condition, so that powers of resist-
ence are easily overcome, or merely a tendency 
to disease which is started up and made opera-
tive, whereby death results, then there may be 
16 
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recovery eveu though the accident would not 
have caused that effect upon a healthy person 
in a normal state." 
The Court stated that any other construction "would 
be so doctrinaire, so headed toward futility, that it 
would reduce a policy and its coverage to contradiction 
and absurdity." 
The Court ref erred to a statement made by Justice 
Cardozo in Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., 254 N. Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914, that "a policy 
of insurance is not accepted with the thought that its 
coverage is to be restricted to an Apollo or a Hercules." 
The opinion in the Browning case is ref erred to at 
length in the brief of Appellants. However, Appellants 
• 
are relying on the dissent of Justice Wolfe as to this 
particular part of the decision and not the ruling of 
the Court as stated in the opinion of Justice Larson. 
The ruling of the Court in the Browning case clearly 
supports the instructions and the verdict in the case 
at bar. The Court summarizes its holding on page 569 
as follows: 
"We must therefore hold that where disability 
results, even though aggravated or intensified 
by disease which follows as a natural, though 
not necessary, consequence of an accidentp,} 
physical injury, or where the disease is induced 
or set in motion as a result of the injury, the 
disability or death is deemed the proximate 
result of the injury and not of the disease as an 
independent cause." 
17 
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It will be recalled that the fact situation of the Brown-
ing case iiwolved an accidental injury to a finger in 
which arthritis developed in the joint on account of a 
toxemia in the body. 
A similar result was obtained in the case of Thibo-
deaux v. Pacific 1lf utual Life Insurance Co., ( 1959) 
237 La. 722, 112 So.2d 423. This case involved a similar 
fact situtaion. The Plaintiff sustained a low back injury 
precipitating an asymptomatic condition of spondylo-
listhesis to a disability. The Court quoted from 29 Am. 
Jur. Sec. 932, "Insurance", Pg. 707: 
"In accident insurance the question whether the 
insurer is liable for an injury depends upon 
the proximate cause of the loss. The term 'proxi-
mate cause', as here used, means the same as in 
other cases, and a provision requiring loss to be 
caused by accident 'independent of all other 
causes' is equivalent to a provision requiring it 
to be the proximate cause." 
And further: 
"A review of authorities convinces us that 
where an insured has a dormant condition and 
such condition is awakened by accident, the 
condition is not deemed the cause of the disability 
or loss which the insured suffers." 
The Court also quotes from the case of De Blieux 
v. Travelers' In~urance Co., 185 La. 620, 170 So. 14, 
page 17: 
"Does the provision of the policy 'the effect 
resulting directly and exclusively of all other 
causes from bodily injuries sustained during 
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the life of this policy solely through accidental 
means' mean that there can be no recovery if 
there is a latent or dormant disease which be-
comes active through the agency of the accident, 
and co-operates with the other effects of the acci-
dent in bringing about the death? 
We think that, if the accident is the proximate 
cause of the death and sets in motion or starts 
a latent or dormant disease, and such disease 
merely contributes to the death after being so 
precipitated by the accident, it is not a proximate 
cause of the death nor a contributing cause with-
in the meaning of the terms of the policy." 
Defendants in support of their argument that the 
Court should have directed a verdict in their favor cite 
the case of Thompson v. American Casualty Co. (1968) 
20 Utah 2d 418, 439 P.2d 276. This case fully supports 
the contention of Plaintiff herein that a jury question 
was created by the evidence and that the Court cor-
rectly submitted the case to the jury. In the Thompson 
case there were prior conditions which the Defendant 
claimed cooperated with the accidental injury in caus-
ing the disability. The Plaintiff in that case contended 
that the disability resulted from the accident directly 
and independently of other causes. The Court reversed 
the summary judgment which had been granted by the 
Trial Court in favor of Defendant. The quotation 
from the Thompson case in Defendants' brief was mere-
ly a recitation as to the contention that was made by 
the Defendant in that case. The Court held that the 
conflicting evidence required a jury determination, 
which is Plaintiff's contention here. 
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The case of 1'ucker v. New York Life Insurance 
Company (1945) 107 Utah 478, 155 P.2d 173, also 
cited by Defendants in support of their argument 
that they should have had a directed verdict, is distin-
guishable from the case at bar. In the Tucker case, the 
evidence i,vas undisputed that the deceased was suffer-
ing from an active and progressive condition which co-
operated with the accidental injury in causing his death. 
The Court in the 1'ucker case distinguished the 
active and progressive condition from the dormant con-
dition in the Lee case which was activated by the 
accident. 
Ii is submitted that the facts in the case at bar show 
that the prior existing condition which Plaintiff had 
was dormant. 
The Court specifically required in its instructions 
that before Plaintiff could prevail the jury must find 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the condition 
was dormant and was activated and precipitated by the 
accident. 
There was ample evidence in the record to support 
the jury's :finding that it was. 
Another Utah case supporting Plaintiff's conten-
tion is White v. National Postal Transport Association 
( 1953) 1 Utah 2d 5, 261 P .2d 924. The Court in that 
case held that a jury question was presented where the 
deceased suffered an accidental blow to his leg and 
eventually died from a heart condition. The evidence 
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showed that the deceased in childhood had been afflicted 
with rheumatic fever which had left him a mechanically 
damaged heart. However, since youth, the heart con-
dition had not been active. Prior to the trip on which 
the accident happened, Plaintiff's doctor had found 
that his heart condition was under control. As a result 
of the blow to the leg, his leg was eventually amputated 
and it was found that he had suffered from Buerger's 
Disease. The testimony of his doctor described his heart 
as damaged but that the condition was under control. 
A doctor testified that a.s a result of the amputation 
with its attending shock and bedrest, the inactive heart 
condition could have been reactivated, that when the 
heart disease is active, emboli are thrown off by the heart 
and may lodge in the brain or other vital organs of the 
body. All of the medical testimony at the trial agreed 
that in their best judgment, deceased ~ied from the 
lodging of an emboli in the brain. The Court discussed 
the Lee case and held that the facts were within the 
holding of the Lee case and that the Trial Court cor-
rectly submitted tha.case to the jury, stating that there 
was evidence that the blow had activated the dormant 
condition which contributed to the death. 
See the following cases which hold that latent, 
dormant conditions precipitated by an accident are 
within the terms of such policies as the policies in ques-
tion: 
Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Hayes (IO 
Cir. 1950) 184 F.2d 327, a claim on double indemnity 
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prov1s1on of life insurance policy if <lea th "resulted 
independently and exclusively of all other causes, solely 
from bodily injury effected directly by external, violent 
and accidental means"-evidence showed that deceased 
suffered a fall down his basement steps and later the 
same morning found dead in his car in driveway -
autopsy revealed that death was caused by a ball throm-
bus in the left auricle which had become dislodged and 
impacted in the mitral orifice - there was testimony 
that a fall or blow to the body in the area of the heart 
might loosen or dislodge the thrombus if slightly ap-
pendant-held, jury question as to whether accidental 
fall set in motion a latent or dormant disease or diseased 
condition resulting in death of insured. 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Meldrim 
(I9I9) 24 Ga.App. 487, IOI S.E. 305. The Court 
stated: 
"To hold in any case that a contract which stip-
ulates that the loss for death should be payable 
only when the loss results solely and exclusively 
from an injury, would be to hold that death must, 
in every case, be instantaneous and the imme-
diate effect of the injury in question, for it is a 
matter of common knowledge that almost every 
human being has some weak spot in his organ-
ism which might to a larger or smaller degree 
contribute to bring about death in a particular 
case, although another person under the same 
circumstances might not have died. Except in 
the case of a humau being who is in perfect 
health, or unless death is instantaneous, death 
never supervenes when it cannot be said that 
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there was perhaps more than one cause which 
contributed to the fatality. If a company which 
writes accident insurance insures one who is 
suffering from a number of maladies against 
loss of life solely and exclusively due to the 
accident, and an accident happens which perhaps 
w:<;mld not have caused the death of a normally 
healthy person and yet which, by precipitating 
the baneful effects of the maladies, shortens the 
life of the person in question by any appreciable 
length of time, no matter how short, the injury, 
as the underlying e~sential proximate cause, must 
at least be said to produce the result which other-
wise would not have happened at the time and 
place at which it occurred." 
United Insurance Co. v. Ray (1960) 271 Ala. 543, 
125 So.2d 704, - crushed vertebrae when hit by tree 
limb - Defendant claimed pre-existing disea~ed verte-
brae - held within terms of policy. 
Egan v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co. (1936) 
223 Wisc. 129, 269 N.W. 667, prior existing arthritic 
condition in back - Defendant claimed total disability 
partly if not wholly due to prior existing arthritic con-
dition - contention rejected by the Court and disability 
held to be within terms of policy. 
Scanlan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (7th 
Cir., 1937) 93 F.2d 942 - action for accidental death 
benefit where it appeared that insured died of a blood 
clot becoming stuck in the lungs shortly after insured 
had been in an automobile accident, and further that 
at the time of the accident, deceased suffered from vari-
cose vein_s - medical experts testified that the accident 
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may have aggravated that condition and caused the clot 
- Court affirmed a verdict for the Plaintiff holding that 
the evidence supported the verdict and stated as fol-
lows: 
"One may recover on an accident policy such 
as here in issue although the insured suffers from 
bodily infirmities. If the accident brought about 
the conditions from which death resulted, the 
fact that the insured was ill, aged or infirm, or 
had bodily or mental infirmities, would not bar 
recovery provided the accident excited the bodily 
infirmity into activity and death resulted .... 
The infirmity may have made the insured less 
able to resist, but if the accident caused the con-
dition, which in turn affected the weak spot which 
did not resist as well as a healthy body, the cause 
is nevertheless the accident, and recovery cannot 
be avoided or evaded." 
Also see ftlaryland Casualty Co. v. Hazen ( 1938) 
182 Okl. 623, 79 P.2d 577; Escoe v. Metropolitan Life 
In.mrance Co. (1942) 178 Misc. 698, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 833; 
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Wise (1952) 207 
Okl. 622, 251 P.2d 1058; Railway Officials and Acci-
dent Association v. Coady (1899) 80 Ill.App. 563; and 
Jones v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance 
Corp. ( 1935) 118 Fla. 648, 159 So. 804. 
Instruction 13A instructed the jury strictly within 
the rule laid down in the Lee case and left it for the 
jury to decide whether or not the accident of Septem-
ber 21, 1964 activated and precipitated a latent con-
dition to a disability condition. The jury verdict was 
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supported by the evidence. Plaintiff's uncontradicted 
testimony was that he had no complaints of back pain 
and worked steadily for many years prior to the acci-
dent and that the symptoms which Dr. Lamb found 
persisted thereafter. Dr. Lamb and Dr. Holbrook 
both testified that the accident precipitated an asympto-
matic spondylolisthesis to a symptomatic point and 
necessitated the operations subsequently performed. 
Obviously, there was ample evidence to support the 
verdict of the jury as to the disability being caused by 
the accident. 
The finding of the jury that Plaintiff was suffering 
from a total permanent disability was likewise amply 
supported by the evidence. All doctors agreed that 
Plaintiff had a permanent disability and that he could 
not engage in physical labor. Dr. Holbrook, called by 
Defendant, testified that in his opinion Plaintiff could 
never perform the work of a brick mason. Plaintiff 
testified that a brick contractor must also perform hard 
physical labor when called upon. Dr. Moroni Brown, 
who is an expert in rehabilitation, testified that in his 
opinion, due to the disability, age, fifth grade education 
and Plaintiff's general condition including the fact that 
he has sight in only one eye, Plaintiff cannot be rehabili-
tated for remunerative work in this community. 
Instructions No. 14, 16 and 17 were taken 
from the case of Colovos vs. Home Life Insurance Co. 
of New York, (1934) 83 Utah 401, 28 P.2d 607. The 
Court stated in part in the Colovos case at page 406: 
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"It is the opm10n of this Court that the term 
used, 'engaging in any occupation and perform-
ing any work for compensation or profit,' has 
a well defined meaning. It means ability to follow 
any recognized occupation, and to do substan-
tially all the acts that are necessarily and usually 
performed by one who follows that occupation. 
It could not be said that a man could engage 
in an occupation if he were able to do only one 
or two of the acts customarily performed by one 
engaged in such an occupation. Furthermore, 
there is an element of continuity in following 
an occupation; ... furthermore, 'compensation 
or profit', as used in the paragraph quoted from 
the policy, is qualified, and relates to the pre-
ceding words, 'engaging in any occupation and 
performing any work,' and contemplates that 
the compensation or profit to be received from 
the occupation engaged in, or work done, shall, 
in a fair sense, be remunerative, and not merely 
nominal, and in the case at bar a small farmer 
who could not do substantially all of the labor 
that usually is necessary to be done, or a peddler 
who cannot lift or handle the bags of produce 
he is accustomed to peddle, could not conduct 
his farming or his peddling for profit or com-
pensation in a remunerative sense." 
The Colovos case was followed by the Browning 
case, supra, in holding that an oral surgeon who could 
not perform substantially all of the acts necessary in 
his profession was totally disabled within the terms of 
the policy in question. 
Thus it can be seen that the jury verdict holding 
that Plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled 1~ 
26 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
well supported by the evidence in this case to the effect 
that Plaintiff cannot perform his usual and ordinary 
occupation as a brick mason or brick contractor or any 
other occupation for which he is fitted by experience and 
education, his education being only a fifth grade educa-
tion and his experience being solely in the field of hard 
manual labor. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT-
LY ALLOWED DAMAGES FOR FUTURE 
BENEFITS. 
The evidence in this case showed that Plaintiff was 
totally and permanently disabled within the meaning 
of the policies in question. The evidence further showed 
that Defendant repudiated its obligation under the 
policies by unequivocally refusing to pay any benefits 
based on a total permanent disability. 
Plaintiff performed all of his duties under the poli-
cies by submitting his periodic reports. Defendants 
repudiated their obligations under the policies as found 
by the jury. 
The better reasoned line of authorities in the United 
States supports the holding of the Trial Court in the 
case at bar that the insurance company cannot repudiate 
the contract and then be able to pay off in periodic 
installments as provided in said policies, but must 
respond in damages for the anticipatory breach of the 
contract. 
The best way in which damages for the breach can 
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be calculated is the method used in the case at bar, used 
in many of the cases cited herein. This method is the 
one customarily presented to juries in personal injury 
and death cases by taking the life expectancy of the 
Plaintiff and discounting to the present value the bene-
fits for the total life expectancy in the one policy and 
for the period of time involved in the other. Exhibit 
P.15 contains the precise calculations both for the past 
amounts due and for the future benefits reduced to 
present value as supported by the testimony of Ralph 
Cowan as to the rate of return an ordinary prudent 
person could expect in this community with sound in-
vestments of his money. 
The case of Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Rascoe 
(6th Cir. 1926) 12 F.2d 693, cert. den. 273 U.S. 722, 
47 S.Ct. 112, is the leading case for the rule urged by 
Plaintiff. The Court held in the Rascoe case that where 
a contract is executory, the rule that there can be no 
anticipatory breach of a unilateral contract for the pay-
ment of money at some future date does not apply. The 
Court held that where the right of an insured to collect 
disability benefits payable in installments depended 
upon her furnishing regularly to the insurer every 
thirty days a physician's report stating fully her con-
dition and the probable duration of her disability and 
there was an unequivocal repudiation of the contract 
by the insurer, she would have the right to recover 
damages for breach of the entire contract. The Court 
observed: 
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"This is a single contract. The fact that de-
fendant is required to perform in part at stated 
intervals does not change its unitary character 
into a multiplicity of contracts, each relating 
to but one installment. If there has been an 
actual breach, coupled with repudiation, of this 
one contract, then, to avoid a multiplicity of 
suits, public policy requires that plaintiff may 
maintain but one action for the entire damages 
occasioned by such breach." 
Plaintiff in the Rascoe case was suing for benefits 
on a disability policy and Defendant had paid a certain 
amount of benefits including the hospital and medical 
bills, and then refused to make more payments. The 
Court held that this was a repudiation of the contract 
on the part of the Defendant insurance company. 
Another leading case for this rule is the case of 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Phifer (1923) 160 Ark. 
98, 254 S.W. 335. In this case the insurance company 
denied all liability under the permanent total disability 
clause and also claimed that the policy had lapsed for 
non-payment of premiums after the disability began. 
The Court held that this was a renunciation of the con-
tract and that plaintiff could sue for the future benefits 
reduced to present value. 
In the case of Milburn v. Royal Union Mutual Life 
( 1921) 209 Mo.App. 228, 234 S.W. 378, the Court 
applied the same rule stating in part at.page 381: 
"Plaintiff cites Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 
341, 166 S.W. 257, in support of his contention 
that the law of this State is well settled that 
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when defendant failed to perform its contract 
and defaulted, all the installments thereby be-
came due and payable. 
';ye think this is good law and applies in this 
case ... this principal is so fundamental that 
citations are unnecessary .... It is well settled 
that the law frowns on a multiplicity of cases 
where one action will suffice." 
The case of Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Reed 
(1913) 54 Ind. App. 450, 103 N.E. 77, stated: 
"With few exceptions, the Courts of England 
and America have held that the renunciation of 
an executory contract, either before or after the 
time of performance has arrived, or the refusal ' 
to carry out the provisions of a contract in course 
of performance, gives the right of action to the 
injured party for the damages sustained by rea-
son of such breach or repudiation of the contract. 
A denial of all liablity, where liability has at-
tached, is held to give the injured party the right 
to treat the contract as broken or repudiated 
and to pursue his remedy for damages for the 
breach, and to recover, once for all in a single 
suit all that may be ultimately due him." 
Also see the following cases which support this rule: 
Travelers Protective Association of America v. Stephens 
(Ark. 1932) 49 S.W.2d 365; Robbins v. Travelers In-
surance Co. (1934) 151 l\lisc. 151, 269 N.Y.S. 841; 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Schneider (Ind. 
1935) 193 N.E. 690; Prudential Insurance Co. v. 
Sweet (1934) 253 Ky. 643, 69 S.,V.2d 748; Aetna Life 
Insurance Co. v. Davis ( 1933) 187 Ark. 398, 60 S.,V. 
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2d 912; Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Pool (Ark. 
1934) 71 S.,V.2d 455; 11ravelers Insurance Co. v. Lan-
caster (Ga. 1935) 180 S.E. 641; Williams v. Mutual 
Benefit Health and Accident Association (5th Cir. 
1938) 100 F .2d 264. 
Plaintiff urges the Court to adopt the more en-
lightened rule for the reason that justice is better served 
by allowing a Plaintiff in such a case as this to recover 
his entire damages in one law suit. The Defendants in 
Exhibit P.3 repudiated all obligations for payment 
of total permanent disability benefits. To attempt to 
argue otherwise is in opposition to common sense. The 
statement made by the insurance company was definite 
and unequivocal. The company denied absolutely that 
the accident caused a total and permanent disability 
to the Plaintiff. How can it be argued that this is not 
a repudiation of the obligation of the Company? 
The other rule leads to a multiplicity of lawsuits 
which is contrary to sound public policy. The Company 
should not be allowed to repudiate its policy and then 
pay out monthly according to the terms of the policy. 
It should pay damages for its breach. 
According to Defendants' brief, the Company 
would still require monthly proofs of disability. What 
would prevent the Company from again refusing to 
accept the proofs of disability as it did previously? The 
jury found that Plaintiff was totally and permanently 
disabled. The rule urged by Defendants would require 
Plaintiff to run the gauntlet each and every month. 
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The Colovos case, supra, has been cited as authority 
for the rule that future benefits cannot be collected in 
this type of a lawsuit. However, the statement made 
by the Court was dicta inasmuch as future benefits were 
not sought. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's disability could 
miraculously improve and therefore damages should 
not be assessed for the future benefits. Defendants make 
this argument in the face of all of the medical evidence 
that the disability which Plaintiff has is permanent. 
If his disability is permanent, then certainly it cannd 
lessen in the future. 
POINT III. DEFENDANTS l\IADE NC 
ISSUE AS TO PLAINTIFF'S LIFE EXPEC. , 
TAN CY. 
Defendants claim that the Court erred in taking 1 
away from the jury the determination of life expectancy 
of Plaintiff. Defendants make this claim in spite of the 
fact they offered no evidence that Plaintiff's life ex-
pectancy would be shortened on account of his physical 
condition. 
The record will show that counsel made no objec-
tion when the Court decided to take the damage evi-
dence out of the presence of the jury. Certainly, had 
counsel wished to dispute any of the evidence offered 
as to damages, he had the right to do so, but did not 
avail himself of this right. Counsel did cross-examine 
German Ellsworth Brunson, the certified public ac-
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countant who prepared the tables, and was told that 
the life expectancy tables included statistics as to all 
persons whether in good or bad health. Had counsel 
desired to offer testimony that Greguhn' s life expect-
ancy would be diminished, he had the right to do so. 
Since the life expectancy table was not challenged and 
was the only evidence produced as to Plaintiff's life 
expectancy, then, of course, the Court had the right to 
use the table as prepared by Mr. Brunson to assess the 
total amount of damages. 
The use of life expectancy with tables based thereon 
has for many years been an acceptable method of prov-
ing damages in personal injury cases involving perma-
nent disability and in wrongful death cases. What better 
way could be used for determining the total value of 
the insurance policies in question? 
Defendants are in no position to complain for the 
first time in this Court that the life expectancy of 
Plaintiff should have been given to the jury when they 
made no such request or offered no evidence at all dis-
puting the life expectancy as shown in the tables. 
Furthermore, Defendants neither requested in-
structions nor excepted to the Court's instructions con-
cerning the issue of life expectancy and cannot, there-
fore, raise the question on appeal. See Pettingill v. 
Perkins ( 1954) 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P .2d 185. 
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CONCLUSION 
The case was submitted to the jury on instructions 
based on the law of the Lee and Colovos cases. The evi· 
dence supported a finding that the accident of Sep-
tember 21, 1964 activated and precipitated a latent, 
dormant condition to a disability condition. The evidence 
was undisputed that Plaintiff is suffering from a per-
manent disability which is total under the definitions 
in the policies. The Company repudiated its clear obli· 
gation under the policies on proper proof submitted to 
it. Justice demands that the judgment of the lower 
court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Rawlings, Roberts & Black 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RICHARD B. WOOLLEY 
314 Atlas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Harry C. Greguhn 
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